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Correspondence about Friendship In The Classical World review 
 
David Konstan 






      Many thanks for sending me the fine article by Luiz Otavio de 
Figueiredo Mantovaneli, and for offering me the opportunity to reply to 
it.  A response is hardly necessary, but since you have invited one, and 
above all since the Dr. Mantovaneli himself has expressed his satisfaction 
with the idea of inaugurating a dialogue, I am happy to provide a few brief 
comments. 
  
      Dr. Mantovaneli’s main point is that the bonds that Hesiod approves 
are based on the appreciation of character – the virtues of hard work and 
honesty – and so my suggestion that Hesiod was merely looking to utility as 
the basis for friendship is too limited, even if cooperation is a basic 
social need.  The point is well taken, and I do not object to it at all. 
  
      However, the Dr. Mantovaneli seems to have overlooked some of what I 
wrote concerning Hesiod, which would, perhaps, bring our views closer 
together.  I quote from the English version: 
  
There is, however, one passage in which Hesiod seems clearly to be 
speaking about friendship: 
  
Do not make a hetairos equal to a brother [kasignêtos], but if 
you do, be not first to wrong him or lie with your tongue.  If 
he begins by saying or doing something offensive, remember to 
pay him back double.  If he accepts you again into his 
affection [philotês] and is willing to pay the penalty, receive 
him: base is the man who makes now one philos, now another 
(707-13). 
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The term philos here, which occurs in the usual formula for making 
friends (with poieisthai), is likely to be substantival rather than 
an adjective; the context, moreover, suggests the deliberate 
acknowledgement of a special bond that can be broken for cause but 
must otherwise be cherished and respected.  The friend here is in a 
category distinct from that of relative, neighbor, or comrade in 
general.  To have made a friend of someone involves not just warm 
feelings but a sense of commitment to a relationship. 
  
As you see, I think Hesiod recognizes real friends, not just neighbors.  
And I go on to state: 
  
These are the elements that will provide the context for personal 
friendship in the classical city-state: the articulation of a sphere 
between individual household and civic society at large, regulated by 
conventions of sentiment rather than by the law of property and 
political rights, and betraying, at least in the early stages, a 
particular connection with class identity articulated around the 
collective feast or symposium.   
  
So I certainly recognize genuine friendship as a value in Hesiod.  What I 
perhaps failed to do, however, is to indicate that Hesiod has in mind 
virtues and character as the basis for such friendship, and thus deserves 
recognition for appreciating friendship in much the way Aristotle does. 
  
      Let me say again that I am delighted that Dr. Mantovaneli has been so 
gracious as to welcome my comments as a post scriptum to his fine paper. 
  
  
      With best wishes, 
  
  
      David 
 
